This entry comes after I read three extraordinary pieces on the prospects of China and its Grand Strategy, published in three separate forums last week.

Frank Ching at The Diplomat writes on fluid ideology of the Communist Party of China [CPC]. Over the course of its nine decades of history, the CPC has went through many transformations and so has its political platform. Every phase and every generation of leaders have left their own trace on the letter and the ideology of the CPC. Initially, in its nascent phase, the Party embraced Marxism-Leninism. After it came to power, it added Mao Zedong Thought as its influence, which gradually became “the guiding ideology and theoretical basis” of the CPC and was considered not only the Thought of the Chairman, but the collective thought of everyone in the high ranks of the Party. The reference to Maoism is still present in the Party’s constitution, even though CPC for the most part (especially when it comes to the perpetual class war) has departed from it long time ago.

After the era Deng Xiaoping, the CPC added the Deng Xiaoping Theory to its official ideology profile, revolving around the idea of stupendous economic growth and achievement of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” to its list of influences (even though, as the author wittingly remarks, Deng himself was more of a pragmatist than theorist). The rule of Jiang Zemin has amended the Party ideology with the notion of the Three Represents, meaning that “the party represents the interests of advanced social productive forces, advanced culture and the majority of the Chinese people” (unlike before, when the Party represented solely the proletariat).

The impact of Hu Jintao on the redefinition of Marxism-Leninism, on the other hand, is seen in his trademark reference to “scientific outlook on development” and “building a harmonious society.”

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Hu’s legacy is closely examined in the article on the debates on China’s Grand Strategy, authored by Wang Jisi of Peking University, published in the last issue of Foreign Affairs. The pillars and priorities of China’s Grand Strategy, as Wang points out, are to be sought in the recently embraced discourse by China’s leader: a) stability of the country, the Party and the socialist system; b) sovereign rule; and c) sustainable economic and social development. Analyzing these priorities, as well as the changing nature of the external relations of the country, the author observes four important transformations/challenges regarding both home and foreign policy:

1. Adoption of comprehensive idea about what national security is; including notions such as economic security on top of the traditional understanding of security as a political/military domain.

2. Shift towards multilateral relations and issue-related diplomacy from traditional bilaterlism (partnership instead of alliance); moreover, China is learning to overcome conflicting attitudes and always look for converging interests in order to build and maintain partnerships.

3. Shifting from economic growth, traditionally interpreted solely as rise of the GDP, towards the principles of economic development. China is “slowly giving way to concerns about economic efficiency, product quality, environmental protection, creation of a social safety net, and technological innovation” and attempts to increase domestic consumption.

4. [a truly audacious statement] Value change – only substantial internal reform can change the impression about China outsiders have; the state needs to accept common values “such as good governance and transparency,” but also show “firmer commitment to the rule of law, democracy, and human rights.”

What role China has ascribed to itself, in the multipolar world of the 21st century? As Wang argues, China of today does not want to become a hegemony nor impose its norms on other nations. The core principle of its Grand Strategy should be the “improvement of the Chinese people’s living standards, welfare and happiness through social justice.” However, China still has to put effort in promoting “a more benign image on the world stage.” As the author writes, “only a China with good governance will be likeable China;” therefore, it has to “learn that soft power cannot be artificially created: such influence originates more from a society than from a state.” In order to achieve these goals, China will need to better coordinate the policy making and the policy implementation process across different sectors and different levels of governance; secondly, it will have to pay closer attention to the diverging views of various factions of the elite, and take in account the public opinion expressed by Chinese netizens.

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A mandatory detour. “The next 300 million Chinese internet users” and their impact:

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Finally, Lena Ren goes on where Wang ends, in an article published at the East Asia Forum, reminding us of the dynamic of the changing social landscape and the challenges for achieving social stability (harmonious society) in the country. Ren makes an especially relevant point when addressing the large scale rural-urban migration. The ever growing inequality among the population that mostly happens along city/village lines, brings about the harsh reality of rural migrant workers who have undignified lives in the rapidly developing urban centers (a point more thoroughly examined in the slideshow above).

Ren makes several other important accounts: China has a rapidly aging population as a result of the one child policy (which calls for a separate entry soon); it faces prevalent corruption and lack of social safety net. The rise in public protests and workers’ strikes that take place every year (from 8,700 in 1993 to 87,000 in 2006) is an indicator that there is growing resentment among the population, flagging not only the need for a Grand Strategy that will aim at providing social justice, but pretty much an immediate policy measure that will follow the same direction.