Hunger defines me. I’ve always been hungry, but now my appetite has risen to a new level. My will is greater than ever. The motivation to succeed runs through me like blood. [...] The mountain I once climbed to reach the top looms in front of me again. I realize how hard it will be to climb it, how much I will have to sacrifice and overcome to get to the top again, how many people have told me I can’t do it. But I savor that challenge. Feed off of it. That challenge helps give me purpose and inspiration. It helps me define life.

At the beginning of [all] this [...] there was a question floating around in my mind. What is my purpose? On one level I understood the reasons for why I do what I do, but on another level I felt an even greater commitment tugging at my soul. I’m a ballplayer, a teammate. A leader. But is that it? When I look back at my [past], I realize that all of the faces that once surrounded me are gone. I was a kid back then, eager to please, eager to find my place in a world that seemed familiar but different. The game was my refuge. [...]

[...] The struggles I’ve encountered over the last few years have made me realize just how much more there is for me to accomplish. I’ve begun a new phase of my life; I’ve opened new doors. And with new doors comes a whole new world of challenges. [...]

What I have come to learn is that my desire to win, the will to pursue my goals with the highest level of intensity and passion, defines me. But I have been careful to keep my motivation pure. The distractions that come with winning, the idea of [doing it] for the money or [...] for the fame and prestige — I’ve watched all of these things consume other[s]. My thirst for domination is fed only by the game. I refuse to get distracted by outside forces.

This is a new book in my career. Volume One has already been written. Everything that I accomplished before is behind me: not forgotten, but placed on the shelf. My past success only serves as a measuring stick for my peers. [...]

I have learned that it is OK for me to be me, and what being me entails. It means that I will not rest; I will not sleep, relax, relent or be satisfied until my goals have been met, the challenge answered and all my doubters silenced. I will not give in to my foes; I won’t let down my teammates. I won’t stop inspiring those who look up to me or stop giving motivation to those who motivate me. I will not back off until I’m back on top, back in the place where they said I could never be again. Mountains don’t scare me. The LACK of mountains scares me. The climb up, the struggle for every inch of ground and every level of ascension is what feeds me. I welcome that challenge. I welcome that chance to be fed because no matter what — no matter how hard, how far, or how many stand in my way, I remain determined.

[Read the whole piece]

Screw academic impartiality. Kobe Bryant is the real-life Courage Wolf. He is the most determined, the most focused, clutchest player in basketball history. His story is much more than pure basketball skills or talent or hard work; it’s rather the sense of purpose, sense of mission, and the self-confidence that make Kobe what he is. No pressure or external influence can crush his willingness to win; no excuse can alleviate the pain of failure. In the rather erratic, profane world of professional sports, Kobe is the only old-school gentleman left, fighting for almost outdated values of pride, honor, dignity and ultimately, winning it all, but winning it gracefully. I just love re-reading this piece he originally wrote years ago, when he just parted ways with Shaq and was left with a mediocre Lakers team.

Since then, Kobe became an MVP, won two more titles in three trips to the NBA Finals, engraving his name in history as one of the greatest. Coming of one of his worst seasons last year which ended with a playoff sweep by the Mavs, Kobe this year plays through the toughest of physical and emotional pain – battling a myriad of injuries, and going through a divorce [which also stripped him off half his wealth]. And while many analysts wrote him off as too old and past his prime, his response comes in the form of leading the Lakers to currently #1 spot in the Pacific, by bombarding opponents [averages 28.1/5.4/4.6 and had made several epic game-winning shots], or just by being Coach Kobe on the sidelines.

Again, in his own words:

That mountain, the one that I climbed once and now face again, is huge. I’m looking up at it again. And because I know how hard it was to climb, I sometimes feel drained because I know how difficult it will be to conquer. It’s much harder to go from top to bottom to the top again than it is to simply go from the bottom to the top. But desire is the ultimate fuel. Hunger changes any situation. My past experience gives me knowledge that backs up my will. I know what must be done.

Being at a crossroads myself, coming of age, and having a long road ahead to reclaim what I once had achieved, I just have no other option but tag this post “personal” as well.

Will post much more soon, these are quite old in fact.

Basketball-wise, his emergence has been quite amazing, and a presentation of great effort, persistence and courage. Lately, the shift from a bench warmer to a starter has taken a toll on his play and I personally believe that he is already past his peak (yet, what he did to my Lakers, and especially that game-winning three pointer against the Raptors are admittedly events that will go down in history books). However, from day one, Lin’s story has been more about his race, than about his game. On one hand, his emergence has been an act of empowerment of Asian Americans, especially Asian American males. On the other hand, his case has exposed a lot of the covert racism in the US and opened very important debates on (in)tolerance and living with (or without) it.

In this part of the world, Jeremy Lin has been appropriated as a national hero on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (but more so on the island), and stirred debates on national identification and the state of Chinese basketball and society in general (could Jeremy Lin become who he is now if his parents did not migrate to the US? arguably not).

To me however, a very intriguing, yet under-explored aspect of Lin’s story has been his religiousness. Lin is an openly devout Christian, and one of the most religious celebrities I know of – he wants to become a pastor after his basketball career is over. On his web-page, religion is the first thing you see in his biography. His Twitter profile is all about god – both in terms of the description, the profile picture and his tweets. Every public statement, and every media opportunity, is used by Lin to thank god and celebrate his name. In this, he has an accomplice – his teammate and great buddy Landry Fields. They started performing a so called “nerd shake” (graduates of Harvard and Stanford respectively) before every game, consisting of simulation of reading the Bible. And this has greatly shaped the image of Jeremy Lin in my eyes (and personally, it has prevented me from jumping on the Linsanity bandwagon – I just want to believe it was his devotion to the game, his tireless practice and skill that made him do what he did on the court, that it was Knicks’ team play and sacrifice that brought them back into the playoff race, and that it was not a super-natural mega-being that did all that).

On the other hand, I inevitably associate Lin’s religiosity with Christianity in China, and in particular, one subgroup of the local Christians here – the recently converted “pro-western” Christians (there are many other subgroups, of course, and the one I am talking about is by no means the only or predominant one). This is a category of the population that adopt Christian faith, lifestyle and symbolism as an outcome of their search for a post-traditional Chineseness. I’ve met rocket scientists, critical thinkers, intellectual wannabes, artists and sportsmen – all of them young middle-class urbanites, English speaking, who travelled abroad, and are overall open-minded – who have embraced Christianity because it gives them a distinct sense of purpose, but moreover, a means to differ themselves from the millions of their co-citizens and be more similar to their foreign fellows – or simply feel more globalized. Becoming a Christian, in this sense, is an act of deeming China’s cultural inferiority to the West (in China, Jesus is white and often speaks English), and escaping the alleged vacuum of values in the contemporary Chinese society. Christianity in this sense is another “cool” brand for the middle-class Chinese, on par with Apple, Converse Allstars, McDonalds and Starbucks – which additionally, has a subversive overtone, and hence, is quite popular among the category I described above. Jeremy Lin does not belong to this group as his personal history is more American than Chinese – but with his public acts of Jesus loving he perpetuates the process of conversion and promotes Christianity among young Chinese (as are Hollywood movies, musicians and other sport personalities, since Christianity is so embedded in Western popular culture).

In some other blog entry: how I ended up encircled by an angry mob of Chinese Christian students after trying to prevent a missionary from showing pre-school English learners a “really cool cartoon” that turned out to be an animated Bible.

In the past years, many questioned his achievements. Macedonia’s transition was marred by corruption and perpetual economic decline; and its international recognition came to a price too high, paid to its southern neighbor Greece. The peace he secured was not lasting; very soon after he left office, Macedonia saw the outbreak of an ethnic/ethnicized conflict.

Nevertheless, Gligorov’s contribution has to be measured within the context of its own era, which he adequately named “Times of Whirl” (a title of one of his memoirs). He was a peace-broker, facing the boiling resentment across the region; he was patient and down-to-earth bureaucrat in times when charismatic leaders called for wars; at the end of the day, he gave up a lot of his support by undertaking unpopular yet inevitable decisions. He headed a newly independent state with no statehood experience, a nation in the making too diverse to be unified, too burdened by history to look towards the future. Its economy needed to undergo a multi-faceted transformation – from socialism to market economy, but moreover, from a periphery in the large Yugoslav market to an independent one – in times when its main economic axis (north-south) was disabled, due to the wars and the sanctions against Milosevic’s regime in the north, and the Greek embargo over the use of Ancient Macedonian symbols (later declared unlawful). He however, did little to curb corruption and only temporary postponed armed clashes. Maybe he could have done better bargains on the international stage. We will never know if he did his best, but we can be sure he avoided the worst.

* * *

Gligorov did things his own way. He did not handle isolated questions, but treated politics in a holistic way. He accepted his imperfection and his limitations; and he knew commitment and consistency. He never accepted pure pragmatism and was little concerned with the immediate effects of his decisions. He was ultimately a politician with a sense of what is right and wrong, adhering to his own moral code; he did not care for eventual gains and losses, but rather for maintaining values and nobility. He was a gentleman (as foreign diplomats described him); and moreover, a man of virtue.

* * *

Gligorov ended his presidency in tears. In a dramatic TV appearance, he was lamenting over the unilateral decision by the newly elected government in 1999 to establish full bilateral relations wih Taiwan (which consequently attracted the scorn of Beijing). Very soon, Gligorov’s warnings about the apocalyptic nature of such decision came true – China’s outrage translated in only one of its handful negative votes in the UN Security Council, which ended the mandate of the UN security forces in Macedonia, whose withdrawal from the border with Kosovo undoubtedly contributed to the ethnic conflict in 2001.

In his emotionally charged address to the nation, Gligorov called for reasonable and responsible behavior – however, his request was met only by mockery and disdain by the surging nationalists. He asked not to be abandoned in his efforts to secure better future for the country, but the sad truth was that Gligorov was abandoned and alone long before his dramatic TV appearance. It only took that particular diplomatic maneuver to expose the erratic and bizarre nature of Macedonian politics, and his own helplessness.

* * *

Gligorov was a lone wolf, one of the rare representatives of the old guard of politicians that remained in high position years after the Yugoslav break-up (one author cynically said that he almost survived the country he created, alluding to the desperate state of Macedonia’s politics today and its eventual collapse soon). Except from Gligorov and handful of others, Macedonia has since been a country of young, immature leaders and politicians, many of them having their government jobs as first full-time employment, who lacked the minimum prerequisite skills and experience to be in office. Gligorov often used to say that leaders should not be afraid to leave some of the problems and tasks for future generations; however, the unpreparedness of those generations probably had caught even himself off-guard.

Gligorov, to my knowledge remained the sole notable atheist in Macedonian politics. I don’t recall him making a religious reference in his speeches apart from congratulating religious holidays. According to his demands, he was buried without religious ceremony and paraphernalia. Paradoxically, his successor, the late Boris Trajkovski, was a Methodist pastor; all other Macedonian leaders (especially the ones from the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE) have been devout Orthodox Christians. Some of them, have invested heavily in Christianizing the country – by constructing a gigantic cross over the capital, or by subsidizing the construction of temples.

Gligorov seemed little concerned with the irrational at all – he nonchalantly handled symbolic disputes and was first and foremost, a politician devoted to progressive ideals. EU and NATO apologists want to label him as pro-Westerner for his efforts to gain international recognition (which he actually managed to do better than anyone else).

He never intended to offend or hurt anyone’s feelings; he was simply above all that.

* * *

Historically, Gligorov was part of the cohort of communist reformers – individuals that posses all the traits that the majority of the members of the post-communist political elite desperately lacks, from humility to compassion to professionalism, to adequate training, experience and ability to acknowledge their own shortcomings. Most of the representatives of the old guard, in this sense, were politicians of virtue.

Yet, in the post-communist years, many of them have been literally ousted from the mainstream discourse – partially because of their own sense of non-belonging (one might see this as hubris or arrogance); but to the great extent due to the aggressive retaliation of the anti-communist sentiment by newcomers. Many of them have been blamed and cursed, or simply forgotten and overlooked.

* * *

I had an invaluable opportunity to meet and interview some of living members of this group during a research project that dealt with the “old” and the “new” elite in Macedonia and Albania; and I was left speechless by some of the responses I received. I will forever remember the words of one former high-rank official, who told me something along the lines that he feels sad about today’s politicians that narrow-mindedly represent party agendas, and speak publicly on behalf of their leaders; as he described, back in the days, communists would rather go at each other passionately, debate ideas and propositions till the late hours, and openly confront each other and especially their superiors. They were strong individuals in a collectivistic society, pushing for changes, risking their own well-being (many in fact had suffered consequences for sounding their opinions), and ultimately, naively putting the promise of democracy and liberalism on the agenda. However, they failed to transmit the hype to the next generations. By many standards, these old wolves appeared to be more progressive than their heirs.

As some of themselves agree, the mistake of communist (and post-communist) reformers perhaps was going too far and too lax. It might have been the rapid, uncontrolled opening up that created the vacuum for nationalist and populist movements to emerge; that led to the demise of a generation of skilled and experienced individuals and the rise of incompetence.

* * *

Politics of virtue is long gone (if it ever was there, when we look beyond individual exceptions? who knows.), and is being replaced by politics of immediate interests. At the end of the day, this does not necessarily has to be bad – yet for now, it seems to be counter-productive and regressive.

The demise of politics/politicians of virtue of course, is not a problem of Macedonia per se – many pseudo-democratic post-communist countries suffer from the reign of opportunists and autocrats, individuals without any reliability, populists without any sense of responsibility, driven by self-righteousness and material interests. How this topic touches upon Gorbachev’s suggestion to Putin to step down following Russia’s unrest in the aftermath of the recent elections, and how all of this resembles a danger for the leadership of China’s Communist Party, and why China couldn’t and shouldn’t pursue Western style democratic ideals, in some future piece.

For now – rest in peace Kiro Gligorov. He was a true statesman, and probably the first and the last one my country has ever seen.

Beijing to me, among other things, is about pollution. My first impression from this city was – too much smog. For instance, when I went to Tiananmen during my first few days here, I barely got to see Mao’s portrait – I also went to see other landmarks, but to my great disappointment, there was no opportunity for nice touristy photos – everything was smudged into grey mist.

Since then, I have read quite a lot about environment deterioration in China in general, and about pollution in Beijing in particular. I follow the @BeijingAir Twitter account that tweets what is measured by the device set up by American Embassy in Chaoyang [surprisingly, the device is currently down]. I discuss the “miasma” issue actively with people here. Most of the people, at least fellow international and local students, are quite disturbed by it.

The governmental discourse, however, is surprisingly divorced from reality. Officials argue that the air is not that bad, that Beijing has only a “heavy fog” issue rather than smog, and that residents are already used to bad air as China has been polluted for many years now. The government introduced its own standards (measuring only bigger particles) which say the air is much better than the US embassy tweets – however, their measuring device is allegedly located far away from the city core.

Cynics (such as @relevantorgans or China Daily Show) make jokes about Westerners’ “politically unreliable lungs,” say that Beijing’s air is politically correct (Oxygen is on the far right in the periodic system, while metals are on the left) or that is simply “air with Chinese characteristics” (70% air, 30% pollution) and that it “smells like GDP growth.”

To sum up – the American embassy sometimes says that air in Beijing is hazardous beyond index; official statistics say it is less worse; people panic. To me, air in Beijing seems horrible, regardless of what is the official information. You can smell it, and you can taste it. It impairs your vision, and it makes you cough.

* * *

Yet to be honest, it was the pollution and the pollution talk in Beijing that made me sensitive about the question of air. I have never really carried about air quality before moving here. Smog used to remind me only of one issue of the Alan Ford comic. I used to think that the air I had been breathing all my life was.. well, clean.

Imagine my reaction, when couple of weeks ago, the city of Skopje introduced the same type of pollution-measuring website like @BeijingAir, which reported Beijing-level pollution! Since then, there are days when its measurements are worse than the ones that the US embassy reports for Beijing. These last few days, while Beijing’s air was hazardous beyond index, pollution in Skopje was at the upper measurable limit – almost 10 times higher than the “healthy” level determined by the WHO.

When I think better – how often we have had “fog” in Skopje, how many people have respiratory problems and how often people get misdiagnosed with allergies, such numbers just make sense. To make things worse, local authorities went on a tree-cutting rampage in the last few years, attempting to speed up urbanization and make Skopje look “modern.” Toxic industries, to my knowledge, remain largely unregulated and environmental protection remains a non-priority. Many households still use coal for heating. Skopje is already over-populated and urban planning is non-existent.

Friends and family members from back home are, of course, frightened. Macedonian media went on a reporting frenzy on environment. Suddenly, the “fog” became “smog” and it became a top story, which probably increased the panic level [some argued that Skopje is the most polluted city in the world]. When I complained about the air here, it seemed to them that either I was exaggerating, or that it was my problem, and a problem of people far away from home. Now they seem to share the similar concerns with me.

Hence, I am left only with the bitter pleasure of knowing that being in Beijing is not as much unhealthy compared to being back in Skopje. Yet, I will now have to bring my breathing mask with me when I go visit. Maybe bring a few. Maybe start a business with masks.

***

Finally, It is very interesting to see how environment is being framed as a policy issue or non-issue.

I already described how things are in Beijing – the government tries to downplay its seriousness, locals and expats panic, activists try to utilize every possible opportunity for sounding their concern and anguish. I am skeptical about eventual significant changes in the future. However, a broader discontent is mounting, as there are rumors that the privileges of the CCP elite, among other things, include purified air at their compounds. Having in mind that it was environmental threat and the inadequate policy to address it that led to massive middle class outrage in Dalian, Beijing authorities are probably cautious with the development of the air debate.

In Macedonia, on the other hand, bad air is still not on the agenda, but might be there very soon – yet, I see clues of it being framed in the existing discourse, while not leading to a rise of a green or environmentalist faction. Yet, it seems, the government will have to take some beating for the pollution. Unlike in Beijing, the data on the pollution come from official, domestic sources, hence it would be futile to blame the “West” for conspiracy (even though the incumbent VMRO-DPMNE government often relies to such strategies). Moreover, environmental protection is part of the synchronizing Macedonian and EU legal and policy framework, as the country aspires to become an EU member state, and therefore high standards will have to be considered. However, one aspect that leaves room for suspicion is the “blame-the-past” mentality of VMRO-DPMNE officials – as with other structural problems, such as unemployment or weak international position, it is highly possible that Skopje authorities will spin the debate towards the problem itself, and not towards its solution. In that sense, they will find it convenient to blame previous governments for the current pollution, and avoid discussing future prospects (even though, in Skopje, and especially in the central district, VMRO-DPMNE has ruled longer than the Social democrats). Finally, one must not overlook the possibility for ethnicizing pollution – for instance, blaming authorities in predominantly Albanian municipalities or even ethnic Albanians for the pollution (by for instance, manipulating stereotypes that Albanians burn trees and coal, and act recklessly since they don’t feel Macedonia as their own country, etc). One thing is for sure – little will be done to solve the problem.

Thus, if anyone is interested in the breathing masks business, please let me know.

I

To say that Occupy is just “a bunch of hippies” in a derogatory way, is to downplay its accomplishments (that are there, even if you disike the movement). Regardless of how it ends, it has done a lot so far – which can objectively measured in media attention despite the initial policy of non-coverage by many mainstream media, multiplication in all major American cities and well beyond the country, and the number of arrests as well as the police brutality to what was a genuinely non-violent action (as a former activist, I strongly believe that repression is a good indicator of success of a protest, especially in a declarative liberal environment such as the US). Ultimately, it is going to affect a lot of the election debates in the US and the local elections in the most affected cities (NYC, Oakland, Portland and so on). Moreover, mocking Occupy for being a “bunch of hippies” mirrors lack of unawareness of the broader historic context to which it belongs. In history books of the future, regardless of the final outcome, Occupy will be mentioned at least in two important lessons on the developments of the twenty-first century world history: a) “People’s struggle for democratization” and b) “The Global Crisis of 2008 and its aftermath” (or “Neoliberal Capitalism and its aftermath”).

It might be a harsh truth for many, but even developed societies suffer from the same deficiencies that can lead to uprisings as the developing ones do. It might be even harsher to realize that the prospects of the US might not be that much different, from the Arab countries affected by the wave of revolt [Mandatory: Stiglitz months before Occupy]. In this sense, the Occupy-optimists might as well frame the movement as another sequel of poorly organized yet tenacious post-ideological revolts (hence no “real” or short-term demands). Such were events in Northern Africa (Tunisia, Egypt, with the exception of the military resistance backed by NATO in Lybia), and it vaguely resembles the color revolutions, and more so other upheavals in Eastern Europe, where, however (as in Iran 2009) events were elections related, yet share the same ethos as the rest of them.

While their targets vary across cases, what is common for these movements is that people protest against corruption (in its broadest meaning) and the inequality of distribution of material and/or other resources. Moreover, in all of these cases, a precondition for the uprising was that the protesters felt powerless to the extent that public demonstration became their last resort and a desperation attempt to channelize frustration. Their success has been generally limited, and the biggest gains were symbolical (such as permanent or temporary removal of autocracy, instigating changes, yet with questionably sustainable and tangible follow-up).

In the case of Occupy, indebted students and disillusioned urbanites got to the streets in a desperate attempt to spell the end of the factual disparity between what the 1% and the vast majority (the 99%). They believe that banks and the finance industry are the most responsible for the exacerbation of the economy, a process out of which common people get hurt, and the financial pundits get richer (which is confirmed by numerous authorities). They are disillusioned with institutionalized democracy and the capacity and willingness of their official representatives to act upon this problem, as American politics is highly dependent on the coalition with, or the support from (some would go to say even the approval of) Wall Street. As in most of the aforementioned cases, in the case of Occupy there was no one single central “Party,” “Association,” “Union” or any other major unitary entity to act as a core agency that mobilizes people), but it was the utilization of communication technology that got all these people who don’t personally know each other together – something that used to be impossible in the pre-Internet world.

More importantly, Occupy is inseparable from the broader aftermath of the global financial crisis, and that is the increased discontents with the personal and overall economic situation in most parts of the world. Yet, the dissatisfaction is a consequence of an ineffective redistributive model (or the lack thereof), that has much deeper roots than 2008, a model that in fact has contributed to the meltdown (since it perpetuates domestic debts).

In other words, the global crisis was/is only the catalyst of the decay of an already malfunctioning model, a disaster waiting to happen. Thus, the Occupy movement fits in the assumptions that growing disparities (a consequence of the crisis), and especially the growing visibility of disparities (the more significant consequence of the crisis) inevitably lead to contention and “revolutionary situation.” America has a high Gini coefficient (measuring inequality of distribution), that puts the country into the risky zone for social upheavals, on par with China (where inequalities are even more visible, a topic that I plan to address soon). Having in mind that many people have been preparing for anti-rich people action for ages, I would even say that Occupy, in its current non-violent form, is the least that can happen – it was only recently that the world was in shock by the London riots and for that matter, events across the whole of Europe, which were also a response to the same problems, which the crisis did not create, but only exacerbated and made more visible. Occupy is less radical, but more powerful sequel of, for instance, the Global Justice Movement and isolated outbursts of discontent around the globe that have seldom made the news (partially, because privately owned media exhibit a tendency of under-reporting such events). Yet, for many, it is a question of time when London or Athens or Rome or Madrid or Seattle 1999, or even 1848 style riots will become daily news everywhere, accompanied by Sao Paolo-like social reality (where rich people use helicopters to avoid not only the traffic but also the skyrocketing crime on the ground – crime perpetuated by nothing else but disparity, as Brazil tops the Gini coefficient ranks). Yet, knowing the gun culture in the United States, and the already demonstrated police brutality and repressive measures against Occupy, one might only imagine what will happen if the protests radicalize. In this sense, I would sarcastically agree when some of the “bunch of hippies” proponents argue that Occupy is not that serious issue – to paraphrase a friend, “maybe only terrorism is enough serious for them.”

II

This a movement based on class, which, as an issue, most Americans don’t much like to confront, largely because to admit that it is an issue is to admit that a great part of the American self-image is a delusion. We do not all have an equal chance. The game is rigged. The economy has been turned into a casino and the house always wins, and we are not the house any more. Not for a long time. Not by the longest shot. And if that’s all these protests ever say, if that’s all that ever gets shouted into the rising autumn wind, then that’s an effort worth making. [Link]

Lots of the “bunch of hippies” response to Occupy stem from the premise that the protesters are attention-seeking spoiled little brats, who have nothing better to do in their free time. It is appalling how condescending such an attitude is. I see it as an exemplary manifestation of hubris.

What we usually see is the hubris of the successful (the self-made rich ones, the ones who have better prospects of getting to the top). This is an attitude, that through looking down on the protesters and blaming them (Herman Cain went to blame them for not trying enough to get a job), commits a (secondary) victimization, not only of the protesters, but also of the many who remain silent (especially the most deprived strata of American society) – many of whom, are already victims and pay the cost for the amounting wealth of the few (again, this is backed by numbers). If one adopts a less favorable position towards the Occupy movement than the author of these lines, the argument still prevails – at the end of the day, Occupy is a desperate attempt to convey a message that is pretty clear – we need a shift of our long-term priorities towards fairer re-distribution of wealth, authority and dignity. And while you can ignore, censor or arrest some (in this case, thousands) of the messengers, the chance is that there will be more and more messengers in the days to come.

However, the successful ones, and especially the 1% themselves are a highly controversial category – and to say they are only undeservingly at their position is an understatement. I, for one, would expect their hubris as many of them are high on self-righteousness. [Mandatory reading by George Monbiot]

I am more appalled when the “bunch of hippies” argument is used by someone not as affluent.

And nothing more ironic than a struggling person who cannot repay their mortgage or cannot pay for medical treatment or cannot pay for their children’s education cursing “Look at that bunch of anti-American hippies. Everyone knows we need less taxes and smaller government. They should get a job and cut this communist bullshit.” It is the myth of the undefiable free market American style capitalism that leads to the fallacy/groupthink that evoking class division discussion is wrong (or is a “hippie”). Comparing America to Egypt? Say what?

In fact, one can see the usage of the “hippies” argument by itself, even outside the context of Occupy, as a normal, every day thing (as if a “hippie” is a more benign version of “communist” – in the very McCartian rhetorics). The bashing of “hippies” has in fact been a trait of American public debate ever since the emergence of the hippie movement itself, while the meaning of the term has been broadened to include much of the individuals whose political attitudes are informed by external, universal, supernational values – all of which contradict or simply transcend the notion of “national interest.” For example, advocating for the universal value of peace, the trademark hippie ideal, in times of war is seen as an act of treason (when it is not condescendingly seen as naivety) – and this is case not just in America, but everywhere else. In other words, the “hippies” are the American version of what every nationalist discourse targets as its fierce enemy, at the same time needing it for its own reproduction – the “traitors” of the nation, who create disunity and harm the country’s image abroad. They are seen as non-members of the community who are either not conforming enough or have voluntarily opted out and eventually joined the enemy lines. Therefore, they are not entitled to represent no one but themselves, not to say the 99%, and what they say is not to be taken seriously. Hence “the bunch of hippies” is to a certain extent manifestation of nationalism-inspired hubris, a product of heavily ideologized education system and public debate.

Additionally, when it comes to the message of the hippies in the case of Occupy – it happens to run even more so against American national mythology. While protesting against war might somehow be understood and excused, protesting against Wall Street cannot be forgiven by any means. Capitalism (especially its Wall Street variant) and free market are to many Americans part of their national self-identification (especially the generations socialized during the Cold War). Wall Street itself is a national symbol of America and its prowess. The (pseudo) free market-as-a-national-interest discourse is also intertwined with the idea of American modernity and successfulness of the US as a historical exception, and as a nation that is to lead the world towards progress. The critical education and the public debate on economics is extremely narrow and critiques of the existing model are marginalized [Mandatory: as part of the Occupy movement, Harvard students stepped outside of the classroom protesting the (mono)ideological bias of their economics class]. No alternatives are considered, even at times of crisis. One might write lengthy on the nature of this relationship as well as the interplay between nationalism, financial and political power/interest of the elite and the public discourse on economy, but for the sake of being concise I would not engage in such an undertaking right now – though I argue that we should consider the possibility that the interest of the 1% (the fortification and the spread of the economic model in which the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer) has been embedded into the national doctrine – on the expense of precisely those Americans who, to borrow a term from Marx, constitute the lumpenproletariat. Yet, many of those who are not CEOs, manage to think of the world like ones (the example above).

The bottom line is that, for many Americans, to accept that what Occupy says makes sense is to give up much of the pride derived from being American, and the hubris that comes with it. It is to accept that there is a hard road ahead, which will begin by reconsidering how Americans (and therefore the rest of the world) will achieve our global long-term goal, and that is simply to achieve well-being for as much as people possible, as soon as possible. That itself is a hard thing to swallow. Yet, for now, Americans, and for that matter everyone else should thank the Occupy movement for shifting the public debate towards the interest of 99% themselves (again, statistically they exist, even if they are not represented correctly by the Occupy movement). It is also in the interest of the super-rich, as well America, since their security largely depends on patching up the class cleavage.

Many media outlets, bloggers and social media users from China and abroad wrote on the incident and some even re-posted the video [I would not go on to do that here]. Often, they went on to comment on how the incident was a reflection of a deeper “disease” of the Chinese society, of the ultimate selfishness brought by economic development or of the legacy of Mao’s era and lack of monotheism [!!!]. Chinese media were especially harsh in their take.

However, while I find the video quite disturbing, and agree that it is an indicator of something being rotten in the Middle Kingdom, I refuse to join the bandwagon of “Chinese mentality” bashers. I believe most of the reactions to the incident suffer from a) over-generalization; b) singliing “China” from the rest of humanity.

First, to say that the incident shows us how China is today is getting things way out of their proportion. What happened in Foshan is exception, rather than the rule [even metaphorically speaking]. While I would agree that Chinese people are not the most helpful people in the world [but then, who is?], I claim that there are still many Chinese people who actually would help a local or a foreigner in a most frank, altruistic manner – such as the person who actually saved the little Yueyue at the end. Looking beyond the case – I could easily bring in my personal experience, but I won’t, since it might lead to another fallacy – that Chinese are extremely helpful. Truth is, Chinese, and people in general, can choose help or not, but it really depends on situation, which brings me to the second point.

What I find even less appealing in the debate, is the tendency to single out China as a unique case – as if what happened in Foshan [read China] has never happened and will not happen anywhere else. The chance is, however, the Foshan tragedy could happen literally elsewhere, on any continent. Why? Because the reaction of people in Foshan was a manifestation of human nature. It is called the bystander effect. Psychologists have proven that people tend to avoid responsibility when there are more bystanders – primarily because they don’t feel morally obliged, thinking that someone else will probably help the one in need [but also, because of personal self-interest, in the first place - because they are in a hurry!]. There are many known and unknown cases of this. Unfortunately, being a good Samaritan is still quite an exceptional, unconventional human behavior.

Stating that the Foshan incident is a metaphor of how China is today is doing wrong both to China students and social psychology. The right way of putting it would be: while the Foshan incident tells us something about China today, it tells us even more about humanity as a whole.

Personally, throughout my life, I have never intimately defined myself as European or Westerner, even though my self-understanding has been greatly shaped by what we refer to as “Western culture.” Yet, the society that I come from – Southeast Europe / Western Balkans / former Yugoslavia – is seen, both by locals and foreigners, as a non-European one, having its distinctive characteristics – from the non-European, Ottoman path to modernity, to the infamous wars of the late 20th / early 21st century. Although geographically it is part of Europe, it still remains as an external Other. On the other hand, the West in the Southeast European common sense is a foreign and distant entity, both discursively [in terms of development disparity] and physically [due to the limited ability to travel].

And here I am in China, where the term “Balkans” is all but known or relevant [only Belgrade is an exception, due to the 1999 China embassy bombing during the NATO campaign against FRY]. What matters, however, is my skin color and my average English accent, which for the majority of Chinese [struggling with pronunciation, as "we" struggle pronouncing Mandarin] sounds native-like. These two features were enough for me to be assigned the role of a Westerner, or more precisely, a European [and I feel more European in Beijing rather than in Brussels].

If nothing else, this is a puzzling situation and maybe a prelude to serious research work on the topic. I hope that I will soon write some notes on how Chinese see foreigners and vice versa; and will attempt to discuss China from a Balkan perspective [in order to maintain my Balkanocentrism, of course].

I said goodbye to Macedonia in the best possible way. Couple of days before my departure, I had my book on the Greco-Macedonian symbolic conflict promoted in Skopje. You can see pictures and the video of the event.

And then China. Third time a visitor, but the first time I am in Beijing and the first time I’m staying long-term.

During my first days here I lived as a tourist, being all lovey-dovey with my long-distance loved one, enjoying the comfort of a very cozy hutong hostel in Dongcheng. I climbed the Great Wall, went to the Forbidden City and the Old Summer Palace but also to some less historic yet nice areas, bought a cheap Kindle knock-off [which works perfectly fine] and successfully got over my culture shocks.

Nonetheless, that seems a long time ago now.

For couple of weeks now I am a full-time student, doing a graduate program in Contemporary China Studies at the Renmin University of China. Work is intensive, but fulfilling. Mandarin is the hardest language on Earth, especially for beginners like me, but I guess Beijing is the best place to learn it.

All in all, Beijing has been great so far [except the miasma we are breathing]. Being here and being a student helps me enter a state of “mental and spiritual cultivation,” “longitudinal tranquility” and “outward benevolence” [using epic Chinese phrases/translations]. I feel inspired and have already planned to write several blog entries on my experience, on China and on politics and society in general, yet the lack of free time prevented me from doing so. You can follow my Twitter account for more frequent updates, yet, hopefully I will get back on track with posting here soon.

The Internet is flooded with reports and information regarding the event. Here’s what I have digested from days-long reading:

The basketball aspect: The fight followed a bad and overly physical game, as well as biased officiating. There have been tens of foul calls, much more on the American team, while Chinese players exhibited confrontational behavior. By the time the game was disrupted, the Bayi rockets had 57 free throw attempts [and only 64 points in total]. Apparently, there were sentiments boiling at the court for a while, before being unleashed into a total fury during the final quarter.

The broader political context: The clash happened at a time when the vice-president of the US tours China, and when the new American ambassador to Beijing has just embarked on his mandate.

Why some people panicked? The Bayi Rockets are affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army [PLA]. The PLA is considered a political hardliner, which adopts much different approach compared to Chinese diplomats, who favor demonstration of soft power. A previous visit by a high American dignitary this year [the visit by the former Secretary of Defense], unintentionally coincided a demonstration of the new super-weapon of the PLA – the stealth combat aircraft J-20 [dubbed Annihilator]. The act, however, stirred many rumors, as many in the West interpreted it as a flexing muscles attempt of the PLA [both to the West and to the Chinese civilian authorities].

The court as a proxy battlefield? There is a strong case that male team sports often have war-like features. It especially holds truth for national sports, although, in this case as in many others, the clubs have probably internalized their role as representing their respective nations [I assume they were homogeneous in terms of players' nationality]. Moreover, it would probably go naturally for the Bayi Rockets [their name resembles the First of August, the national day of the PLA]; on the other hand, Georgetown is a DC representative, and a school from which many American civil servants and politicians have been recruited. Moreover, thinking of the rivalry between the two most powerful nations, it is easy to assume how non-sport sentiments have pushed the goodwill match into conflict.

Digression: As a person from the former Yugoslavia, I am personally very aware of the dangers of sports violence. The clash between the football titans of the Yugoslav league, Red Star Belgrade and Dinamo Zagreb in 1990, which ended into a riot involving police and the game public, was by many dubbed the beginning of the grim wars in the Balkans in the 1990s.

Possible exacerbation of the Sino-American relations? Very unlikely. Of course, one could read nationalist responses online in the event aftermath, but luckily, the brawl was not picked up by officials from neither side. Apparently, the teams made peace later that day and are heading for a re-match on Sunday – hopefully, with better officiating and higher level of fair play. Knowing the importance of maintaining good relations between the two countries, the game will be probably closely monitored and even the smallest incidents will be prevented.